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THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION AND THE RETURN OF THE
BUCKETEERS: A LESSON IN REGULATORY FAILURE
M. VAN SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA). The CFTCA significantly
amended the Commodity Exchange Act and was intended to
strengthen and centralize federal commodities regulation. One of
the specific purposes of the CFTCA was to end the fraudulent ex-
ploitation of the public by bucket shop operators, the "bucketeers"
of the 1970s. Unfortunately, rather than putting an end to the
bucketeers, there was a recrudescence of the bucketeers under the
1974 Act.
Partially in response to the resurgence of the bucketeers,
Congress in 1978 passed the Futures Trading Act of 1978
(FTA). Nevertheless, the bucketeers have persevered and pro-
liferated. This article will trace the emergence of the bucketeers
under the Commodity Exchange Act, their adaptation to the
restrictions of the CFTCA, and their perseverance under the FTA.
*Member of the California and Colorado Bars; LL.B., University of Colorado, 1959; currently
in private practice in Palo Alto, California.
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II. REGULATION OF COMMODITY OPTIONS
A. REGULATION UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT OF
1936
Commodity options are contracts by which one party pur-
chases from another party the right to buy or sell a commodity at an
agreed price and within an agreed time.' In 1936, Congress
prohibited the trading of options on commodity futures by enacting,
the Commodity Exchange Act. 2 'This prohibition was intended to
protect commodity futures markets from the disruption caused by
option dealers. 3
The Commodity Exchange Act regulated only commodity
futures specified by the Act. 4 Thus, the Act did not prohibit options
on futures markets not regulated under the Act, commonly known
as "world" commodities. 5 The lack of regulation under the Com-
modity Exchange Act of the so-called world commodities set the
stage for the return of the bucketeers.
On April 28, 1971, Harold Goldstein opened an office in Los
Angeles to sell options on commodity futures not regulated under
the Commodity Exchange Act. Goldstein had stumbled onto a
1. An option to buy is known as a "call," referring to a party's "calling" for the commodity
from the other party; an option to sell is known as a "put," referring to a holder's "putting" the
commodity to the other party. An option given the holder to either buy or sell is known as a.
"double" option, or "straddle"; a double option or straddle is a combination of a put and a call.
The price at which the holder of an option can either buy or sell the optioned commodity is the
"striking price." When the striking price is the same as the market price of the commodity being
optioned, the option is an "at market" option. If, for the holder, the striking price is better than the
market price, the option is "in the money"; if the striking price is worse than the market price, the
option is "out of the money." The money paid for an option is the "premium." The premium is
paid to the "grantor," or "writer," of an option.
Commodity options specify a period, ranging from two to fourteen months, during which time
the option may be exercised. The date and hour by which an option holder must state that he wants
to exercise an option is the "declaration" date. If an option is not declared by the declaration date, it
is "abandoned" and the premium is forfeited.
The "commission" on a commodity option is a fee for brokering the option. The "break even
point" is how much the price of a commodity must change in favor of its holder to pay for the
premium and the commission. Options which are traded on an exchange are called "exchange
traded" options, and options which are not traded on exchanges are called "dealer" options.
For further explanation of these and other terms used in commodity options trading, see CFTC
v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); P. CRACRAFT,
LONDON OPTIONS ON COMMODITIES 210 (1977); R. GIBSON-JARvIE, THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE
134 (1976); S. KROLL &J. SHISHKO, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE 258-68 (1973); R.
TEWELES, C. HARLOW & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES?
WHY? 227-29 (1974).
2. Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. §5 1-24
(West 1980)).
3. H.R. REP. No. 74-421, 74TH CONG., IST SESS. 5 (1935); Hearings on H.R. 3009 Before the
House Comm. on Agriculture, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 94-95 (1935); P. MEHL, TRADING IN PRIVILEGES
ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 75-78 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture Cir. No. 232, 1934).
4. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 1 2.49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current
version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1980)).
5. See Werst v. First Commodity Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,542 at 22,237 (D. Mass. 1978).
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loadstone of public cupidity. In less than two years, he pyramided
an $800 initial investment into Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc., a cor-
poration with offices world-wide which had sold over 175,000 op-
tions valued at $88 million. 6 Goldstein-Samuelson represented that
its options were backed by a computerized program to buy futures
contracts for every option. 7 Goldstein also represented that it
covered its obligations by matching every dollar of its customer's
profit with a position in the futures markets. 8 Goldstein-Samuelson
actually attempted to cover its options with positions in the futures
markets only during its first few months in business; efforts to cover
options ceased after six months. 9
Although government officials were slow to realize it, Gold-
stein-Samuelson's selling of uncovered, or "naked," options was
nothing more than the bucket shop under a new guise.10 The quin-
tessence of Goldstein-Samuelson's fraud was in representing that
its options were bona fide transactions in which holders actually
acquired a put or call for the commodities optioned. In truth, Gold-
stein-Samuelson's naked options were nothing more than bets
which would be settled, if at all, according to fluctuations in com-
modity prices. Of 175,000 options it sold, Goldstein-Samuelson at-
tempted to deliver the commodity optioned in only four instances,
and actually purchased a futures contract in only one instance. 1 As
sales of options increased, Goldstein-Samuelson had to take in an
ever-increasing amount of new premium money from new in-
vestors in order to cover the increased value of the futures contracts
previously optioned. Thus, the millions of dollars in sales which
6. Stipulation of All Relevant Facts in Lieu of Trial on Preliminary Injunction for the Plaintiff
at 7, SEC v. Goldstein- Samuelson, Inc., No. 73-472 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Goldstein-Samuelson Stipulation].
7. Wall St. J.,June 28, 1973, at 38, col. 2.
8. Goldstein-Samuelson Stipulation, supra note 6, at 12.
9. Id. at 6.
10. See People v. Gardner, 72 Cal. App. 3d 641, 140 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1977). The term "bucket
shop" originally described places on the east side of London where persons who had cadged leftover
beer and liquor would gather together to drink. SeeJ. HILL, GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 39 (1904).
Wychoff attributes the term to the practice of selling odd-lot grain "by the bucket." P. WYCHOFF,
WALL STREET VENTURES AND ADVENTURES 264 (1968). In time, "bucket shop" came to be used as a
term of derision to describe a place where persons placed bets on market quotations.
In executing a customer's order to buy or sell commodity futures or securities, a brokerage firm
will execute its customer's orders by an exchange transaction. A customer's order to purchase or sell
a commodity futures contract must be executed on a commodity futures exchange. A customer's
order to buy or sell a security will be executed on a stock exchange or by a brokerage firm dealing
with its customer from securities it owns. Bucket shops operate under the guise of being brokerage
firms. However, instead of actually executing orders of their customers, bucket shops put orders
down as bets. Bucket shops bet that their customers' margin will be lost before they can make a
profit. To promote their customers' losing, bucket shops set margins so low that normal market
fluctuations do not wipe out customers' margin. Bucket shops also manipulate market quotations so
that customers' margins are lost. WYCHOFF, supra, at 33.
Should enough customers have winning positions, a bucket shop might arrange to have a
market rigged. See E. LEFEVRE, REMINISCENSES OF A STOCK OPERATOR 12 (1923).
11. Goldstein-Samuelson Stipulation, supra note 6, at 11.
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Goldstein represented as financial strength actually guaranteed that
the scheme would eventually collapse. 
12
State and federal securities officials attacked the selling of
naked options on the ground that they were unregistered
securities, 3 since naked commodity options could be characterized
as investment schemes. What a person who purchased an option in-
vested in, albeit unknowingly, was a bucket shop operator's ability
and willingness to keep a Ponzi fraud 14 afloat long enough to pay
off on a winning bet. The value of the commodity option thus
depended upon the ability of the operator to defraud new victims.
Since the purchaser of a naked option risked the money he paid for
the option in a "common enterprise," naked options came within
the traditional definition of a security. 15
As the fraudulent nature of naked options was exposed, courts
began to hold that they were securities.1 6 As securities, naked op-
tions could not be legally sold without being registered under state
and federal securities laws. Furthermore, options dealers probably
would not have been allowed to register had they attempted to com-
ply with state securities laws. For example, the Georgia Securities
Commission took the position that naked options violated statutes
prohibiting bucket shops and could not be registered, even if all of
the other registration requirements were met.' 7 Other state officials
took similar positions. 18
12. To allay a growing suspicion that his options were not covered, Goldstein forged a letter
which he sent to customers stating that American Bankers Insurance Company of Miami had written
a one-million-dollar performance bond to guarantee payment on Goldstein-Samuelson's options. Id.
at 15. Goldstein pleaded guilty to three counts of mail fraud for his use of the forged letter. Wall St.
J., Nov. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
13. Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract As a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as The Naked Option].
14. A Ponzi fraud is synonymous with a big store Peter-to-Paul confidence game in which
investors are lured by the prospect of huge profits on investments. In reality, profits are paid from
money taken in from later investors. The fraud is named after Charles Ponzi, who opened offices in
1919 in Boston and sold a scheme in which investors could double their money in 90 days by
purchasing postal coupons in foreign countries at depressed rates which would then be redeemed in
the United States at higher rates. Using payoffs to early investors to lure victims, Ponzi was besieged
by eager investors. He soon became a millionaire, taking in $200,000 a day. In 1920, the scheme was
exposed by the Boston Globe. Ponzi paid off $15 million of the $20 million he took in during his year of
operation. He eventually was sentenced to four years in prison. SeeJ. NASH, HUSTLERS AND CON MEN
311-12 (1976).
15. See Georgia Sec. Comm'r Release No. 1 (Sept. 18, 1973).
16. E.g., People v. Puts and Calls, Inc., [1973] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,090 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Los Angeles 1973); King Commodity Co. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); 1 A. BROMBERr, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD 442 (1977); see The Naked Option, supra note 13, at
230-31. See also Glazer v. National Commodity Research and Statistical Serv., 388 F. Supp. 1341,
1343-45 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
17. See Georgia Sec. Comm'r Release No. 1 (Sept. 18, 1973).
18. California Securities Commissioner Brian Van Camp has stated that options violated
California bucket shop laws. Barrows Nat'l Business and Financial Weekly, Mar. 5, 1973, at 21, col.
2. The securities administrators of Colorado and Utah announced similar positions. In re
Commodity Options, [19731 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9722 (Colo. Sec. Comm'n); In re Commodity
Options, Notice and Order, [1973] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 47,656 (Utah Sec. Comm'n).
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The strategy of the states and the SEC in attacking the
bucketeers under the securities laws succeeded. 19 By .1975, the
states and the SEC had put the bucketeers out of business.
20
B. REGULATION UNDER THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION ACT OF 1974
In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act. 21 One of the primary incentives for passage of the
CFTCA was to bring options on previously unregulated com-
modities under the jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Act.
22
The CFTCA reflected the hostility of Congress toward the sale of
commodity options, and bills introduced in the 93rd session
prohibited all options. 23  However, under pressure from the
proponents of commodity options, Congress compromised and
delegated to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) the authority to decide whether options should be
banned. 24 Thus, the CFTCA banned the sale of options contrary to
regulations adopted by the CFTC within one year from the
effective date of the Act, unless the CFTC notified Congress that it
was unable to prescribe such regulations within one year.
25
When the CFTC came into existence in April of 1975, it had
the experience of state securities officials and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to draw on in deciding how to deal with
commodity options. The basic problem was to allow option trading
19. See Long, Commodity Options-Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 83 n.30 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Options Revisitedl; The Naked Option, supra note 13, at 212-30.
20. See Options Revisited, supra note 19, at 131.
21. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (amending the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub.
L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1941 (1936)) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1-24 (West 1980)).
22. British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 485-86 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); CFTC v.J.S. LOVE & Assocs.'Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 658-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The dichotomy between regulated and unregulated commodities was perpetuated under the
CFTCA. The flat prohibition of options on domestically produced commodities specified by section
2(a) of the Act was continued in section 4c(a)B. 7 U.S.C.A. S 6c(a)B (West 1980). With respect to all
other commodities regulated under the Act, Congress gave the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission power to decide whether to prohibit or to permit option transactions and, if permitted,
to set terms and conditions. Section 4c(b) provided in pertinent part: "No person shall offer to enter
into, enter into, or confirm the execution of any [commodity option] transaction... contrary to any
rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such transaction or allowing any such
transaction under such terms and conditions as the Commission shall prescribe.
7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(b) (West 1980).
23. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (addition of § 201 without altering 7 U.S.C. 5
6c(a) (B) (1970); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. S 308(b)(2) (1973); S. 2485, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §
6c(a)(B); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (addition of § 7 without altering 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(B)
(1970)). See also Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures
Act of1974, 73 MICH. L. REV. 710, 722 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Role.J.
24. TheRole, supra note 23, at 722.
25. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, supra note 21, at § 402(c) (current version at
7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(b) (West 1980)).
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by legitimate dealers, but at the same time keep the bucketeers
from infiltrating the market. This had always been a difficult task.
26
Outwardly, a bucket shop operation is similar to a brokerage.
What differentiates the bucketeer from a legitimate dealer goes on
behind closed doors. If a dealer spends premium money without
regard to the obligations he has incurred, it is bucketing; if a dealer
spends premium money to cover obligations he has incurred, it is
legitimate options trading. There can be a considerable degree of
variation in how a dealer covers an obligation. A dealer may cover
his obligation by having an inventory of commodities to deliver on
calls, or money to buy commodities to cover his puts. If a dealer
does not want to keep an inventory, he may contract with someone
who has the commodity for delivery to cover his obligation. A
dealer may also cover his position by balancing his obligations
against those of his customers who are on the opposite side of a
market. Finally, a dealer may cover by a combination of the above
methods. If a dealer can use premium money to cover options
solely by speculating in the futures markets, the difference between
covered and uncovered options is chimerical at best.
Because the line between a legitimate and a bucketed com-
modity option can be blurred, the difference will often depend upon
the good faith of the dealer in meeting the obligations of his
customers. For this reason, the regulator, in order to regulate
commodity options, must have power over the premium;
specifically, the power to keep an option dealer from disposing of
premium money until after he has satisfied his obligations to his
customer.27
26. Bucket shops were prevalent in the United States from the 1880s until the 1920s. T.
HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 88 (1971); WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 18, 33.
Although keeping a bucket shop was illegal, early bucket shops apparently were tolerated. The
early bucket shops were patronized mostly by boys who worked as runners for brokerage firms,
school boys, laborers, housewives, and others who had a predilection to gamble a few dollars.
HIERONYMUS, supra, at 89; WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 20.
The early bucket shops do not seem to have made much of a pretense of being brokerage
operations. The line between a brokerage and a bucket shop was often a thin one. Before the federal
securities laws, most securities transactions were on a ten percent margin. See R. SOBEL, THE
CURBSTONE BROKERS 69 (1970). Margin transactions were financed by banks lending money to
brokerage firms to buy or sell securities on margin for their customers. Wall Street banks refused to
be associated with brokerages other than New York Stock Exchange member firms. Id. at 67. The
refusal of banks to lend to brokerages other than members of the New York Stock Exchange forced
members of the Curb Exchange, later to become the American Stock Exchange, and the
Consolidated Exchange to either finance margin transactions with their own money or bucket their
customer's orders.
In 1883, a committee of the Illinois House of Representatives was unable to discern a significant
difference between the trades executed on the Chicago Board of Trade and those in bucket shops. See
Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155 n.5 (1938). In 1891, a member of the
Chicago Board of Trade wrote a pamphlet defending bucket shops. Id. at 156.
Left to their devices, the bucket shops extracted a tremendous amount of money from the
public. See SOBEL, supra, at 71. The large bucket shops did more business than legitimate brokerage
firms. LEFEVRE, supra note 10, at 7; WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 264. The bucketeers had enough
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The Goldstein-Samuelson era dealers could not live with
regulations which forced them to cover their options. As with any
Ponzi scheme, the operation of the naked option dealers depended
upon a continual inflow of money from new investors to pay those
few investors who had purchased profitable options. The illusion of
successful investing is essential to the momentum of a Ponzi
scheme. Money was also needed to pay sales commissions and
overhead, which were quite high. Harold Goldstein testified at a
bankruptcy hearing of Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc., that forty to fifty
percent of the premium money was paid to customers whose op-
tions became profitable, and forty percent went to overhead, in-
cluding sizable commissions to salesmen. 28 Because of the high cost
of their fraudulent operations, naked option dealers could not have
influence in 1903 to kill bills against bucket shops in five of six state legislatures. See HILL, supra note
10, at 40. The Consolidated Exchange, the second largest stock exchange in New York City and at
one time the most powerful rival of the New York Stock Exchange, came to be regarded as a den of
bucketeers. The Chicago Open Board of Trade, the "Little Board" in Chicago, was captured by
bucketeers in order to obtain commodity market quotations. HILL, supra note 10, at 466-67.
The business which bucketeers diverted from brokerage firms provoked campaigns against them
by the exchanges. As bucket shops came under attack, they became adept at disguising their
operations as brokerages. A bucket shop could escape detection by executing a customer's order on
an exchange, but later, without the knowledge of a customer, the dealer would close out the
transaction and carry it as a bet. See SOBEL, supra, at 69; Note, Legislation Affecting Commodity and Stock
Exchanges, 45 HARv. L. REV. 912, 916 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Legislation].
The exchanges attempted to put the bucket shops out of business by depriving them of market
quotations, and eventually established their legal right to prevent bucket shops from obtaining
market quotations. See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236
(1904). This did not, however, put the bucket shops out of business. SOBEL, supra, at 123. The bucket
shops continued to operate, either by surreptitiously obtaining market quotations, or by simulating
market quotations. WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 262.
Bucketeers were prosecuted, but the sporadic enforcement of the laws, light sentences, and the
ability of persons in the highest echelons to escape prosecution made it difficult to put the bucketeers
out of business. HILL, supra note 10, at 39-40; WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 266. Eventually bucket
shops disappeared as a part of the investment scene, probably due to publicity campaigns against
them more than as a result of state police action. WYCHOFF, supra note 10, at 262. In any event,
whatever the reasons for the disappearance of bucketeering, by the 1970s the bucket shop was
considered an anachronism. In February of 1973, the California Commissioner of Corporations
characterized California's bucket shop law as an archaic criminal statute which regulatory agencies
were reluctant to use. Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1973, at 44, col. 2.
27. This was the thought behind regulations which were adopted by the California
Commissioner of Corporations under the California Commodity Law. These regulations required
that eighty percent of premium money be segregated, or one hundred percent of a dealer's
obligations if greater, less the value of the equity of the commodity or futures contract used for cover.
8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 350.545(a) (1974).
The California regulations also required a dealer to acquire the commodity contract underlying
an option when the market price of a commodity was fifty percent or less of the premium received.
Option dealers were further required to have a minimum adjusted working capital, as defined by the
regulations, of $100,000, or more in some instances. Id. at § 350.537.4.
One must have doubts as to how effective the California regulations would have been. The
California commodity bucket shops collapsed under the weight of their own corruption before the
California regulations were tested. The $100,000 capital requirement for entry into the commodity
option business was a nominal entree. It would not have kept the bucketeers from infiltrating the
ranks of the state-sanctioned dealers. Therein lies the problem. What could be a better front for a
big-store confidence game than the great seal of California on a license? Thus, having put a number
of potential bucketeers into business, the regulator must undertake the responsibility to keep them
honest. Short of putting a keeper on the till of each dealer, how would a regulator know what a dealer
takes in or what he does with what he takes in? Ultimately, the California regulations depended on
the willingness of dealers to comply. The state would have been put in the position of sponsoring
dealers without the ability to keep them honest.
28. Wall St. J.,July 30, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
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covered the options they sold, even if they had been inclined to do
SO.
Because of the difficulty of monitoring cover, licensing is
crucial. Josef Rotter, one of the pioneers in the naked option
business, stated that fifty to sixty percent of the individuals who
were option dealers could not have been registered under state and
federal securities laws because of past felonies or securities law
violations.2 9 Stringent fitness and large capital requirements un-
doubtedly would have kept most of the bucketeers from being licen-
sed. The traditional integrity of options dealers in London was due
to the considerable finances required for membership on the Lon-
don exchanges. An analogous incentive for compliance would have
been achieved if dealers had been required to put up funds suf-
ficient to guarantee compliance with regulations before being
allowed to sell options to the public.
It is now apparent, however, that whatever regulations the
CFTC could have adopted would not have made much difference.
Although it was unthinkable that the CFTC would do nothing -
neither ban nor regulate - that is, in effect, what the CFTC did.
The CFTC did no more than adopt a general rule prohibiting the
fraudulent selling of options.30 This was tantamount to granting a
franchise to any charlatan to sell naked options. In setting its
regulatory priorities, the CFTC simply overlooked commodity op-
tions. 31 The CFTC's oversight thus initiated another naked com-
modity option era. But this time the SEC and the states could not
go after the bucketeers, as their laws had been preempted by the
agency charged with such regulation - the CFTC.
The preemption of state and federal securities regulation by
the CFTCA was an historic event. Although federal legislation had
comprehensively regulated the field of commodity futures since
1922, state law had never been preempted. In 1922, Congress enac-
ted the Grain Futures Act. 32 The Grain Futures Act established
requirements for the validity of grain futures contracts and sub-
jected grain exchanges to federal supervision and control. The
recognition of the legality of commodity futures trading implicit in
the Act should have immunized commodity futures trading from
attack under state bucket shop laws. In 1933, however, the United
29. Wall St.J., Feb. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
30. 40 Fed. Reg. 26,504 (1974), proposed codification redesignated by 41 Fed. Reg. 51,817 (1976)
(currently codified in 17 C.F.R. S 32.9 (1980)).
31. See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
32. Pub. L. No. 67-331, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). The Grain Futures Act was amended in
1936 and renamed the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936)
(current version at 7 U.S.C.A. 5§ 1-24 (West 1980)).
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States Supreme Court, in Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 33 held that
the Missouri bucket shop law, under which commodity futures
transactions had been found to be illegal, was not preempted by the
Grain Futures Act. 34 Thus, even though commodity futures
trading was sanctioned by the regulatory effect of federal.law, and
even though the states undoubtedly did not have the power to
directly declare commodity futures trading to be illegal, states still
had the power to indirectly make it illegal by prohibiting certain
trading practices. 
3 5
That states had the power to make illegal an activity sanc-
tioned by federal law was an anomaly. 36 In 1936, commodity ex-
changes sought to nullify the Dickson decision by proposing an
amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act which declared the
validity of commodity futures contracts. 3" This attempt failed. The
anomaly of the states having the power to make commodity futures
trading illegal was incorporated into the Commodity Exchange
Act.
38
Although it may have been an anomaly for the states to retain
the authority to make commodity futures trading illegal, Congress
structured the Act in such a way that the states and the federal
government were able to avoid conflict. In Rice v. Board of Trade of
Chicago,39 the plaintiff contended that the Chicago Board of Trade
had adopted various unreasonable and discriminatory rules which
were invalid, in part, because the Board had ,failed to seek approval
by the Illinois Commerce Commission in accordance with Illinois
law. 40 The Board argued that the state statute which required
Commission approval was preempted by the Commodity Exchange
Act and therefore void.41 The Supreme Court, after considering the
language and legislative purpose of the Act, stated:
[Slection 4c provides that "nothing in this section or Sec-
tion 4b shall be construed to impair any state law ap-
33. 288 U.S. 188 (1933).
34. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 200 (1933).
35. See Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures - A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63, 88
(1933).
36. Bachrach, The Cloverleaf Case, and Suspension of State Gambling Statutes as Applied to Commodity
Futures Transactions, 7J. MAR. L.Q. 457 (1941); Taylor, supra note 35, at 100-02.
37. Proposed Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 6772 Before the Senate
Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1936).
38. "Nothing in this section or section 6b of this title shall be construed to impair any State law
applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sections." 7 U.S.C. S
6c (1970). This language was deleted by the CFTCA. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 5 402(a), 88 Stat. 1369
(1974) (current codification at 7 U.S.C.A. 5 6c (West 1980)).
39. 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
40. Rice v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247, 249 (1947) (construing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 114, § 1946(1945)).
41. 331 U.S. at 249.
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plicable to any transaction enumerated or described in
such sections."... Thus the provision in § 4c serves the
function of preventing supersedure and preserving state
control in two areas where state and federal laws
overlap.
42
Thus, the trend was set for state legislatures and the courts to
recognize the validity of commodity futures contracts executed on
organized exchanges.
43
C. THE REGULATORY GAP
In the aftermath of the Goldstein-Samuelson era fraud, it was
popularly believed that the fraud had come about because of a
regulatory gap. This gap was supposed to have been located
somewhere between the laws governing commodity futures and the
securities laws. It was thought that the Goldstein-Samuelson era
commodity option dealers fell outside of the 1936 Commodity Ex-
change Act because there was no jurisdiction over world com-
modities, and that they also fell outside of the securities laws
because commodity options were not within the ambit of
securities.
44
In truth, there was a plethora of laws which could have been
invoked against the Goldstein-Samuelson era bucketeers. Every
state had bucket shop laws or laws against gambling under which
the bucketeers could have been criminally prosecuted. 45 In addition
to laws against gambling and bucket shops, state and federal
securities laws could have been used to attack the selling of naked
options. Indeed, as we have already seen, state securities officials
42. Id. at 255.
43. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Schriver, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder[ COMM. FUT. L. REP. 1 20,172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). See Legislation, supra note 27, at 920;
Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 831-32 (1951).
44. See Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act; Preemption As Public Policy, 29
VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976); Rainbolt, Regulating The Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 14 (1977); Russo & Lyon, The ExclusiveJurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 59 (1977).
45. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE S 29100 (West 1977) (making bucketing a felony). Section
29008(a) defines "bucketing" to include:
Making or offering to make any contract respecting the purchase or sale of any
securities or commodities, wherein both parties intend, or the keeper [of the place
where the bucketing is done] intends, that the contract shall be, or may be,
terminated, closed, or settled according to or upon the basis of the public market
quotations or prices made on any board of trade or exchange upon which the securities
or commodities are dealt in, without a bona fide purchase or sale of the securities or
commodities.
CAL. CORP. CODE S 29008(a) (West 1977).
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and the SEC invoked securities laws in their successful campaign
against the Goldstein-Samuelson era dealers.
The Goldstein-Samuelson phenomenon did not occur because
of a gap in the law, but because of a lag in enforcement by state and
federal officials. Despite early warnings, the SEC acted slowly
because it was reluctant to extend its jurisdiction into an area which
it had not recently regulated.4 6 As the commodity options fraud
grew to monstrous proportions, however, it became embarrassingly
evident that someone had to do something. 47 By the time the SEC
and state officials decided to shut the naked option dealers down,
the commodity "scandal," as the phenomenon had come to be
known, had already been perpetrated. Even though the SEC and
state securities officials were able to put the bucketeers out of
business under federal and state securities laws, it was the scandal
itself which was remembered, and not that the states and the SEC
had been able to deal with it effectively. Thus, it was presumed that
the CFTC needed exclusive jurisdiction over commodity options to
fill the regulatory gap. 48 The misconception that the Goldstein-
Samuelson phenomenon had occurred because of a gap in the law
was to bring the long dormant issue of preemption to life.
D. THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CONTROVERSY
Several commentators have traced the issue of preemption of
securities regulation as it evolved during the consideration of the
CFTCA. 49 Perhaps the most startling revelation is the polar
vacillation of legislative intent as to the degree of exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of the CFTC. 50 The lack of direction may be partially
explained by Congress's trepidation to realign any jurisdiction
within the federal bureaucracy. 51 In addition, pressure from in-
46. The Associaton of Commodity Exchange Firms complained of options sales before the
United States Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5860-67. Similarly, Henry Jarecki,
president of Mocatta Metals, complained to various officials that the new option dealers were
defrauding the public because the premiums being charged were too low for the options to be
legitimate. SeeJarecki, Mocatta Options: Forerunnerofa Boom Market?, COMMODITIES, Apr. 1977, at 31,
35.
47. The first attack against Goldstein-Samuelson's options was in October of 1972 by the
Oklahoma Securities Commissioner, who served notice of an intent to issue a cease and desist order
against the firm's violations of the state securities law. See Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order,
Okla. Sec. Comm'n (Oct. 26, 1972). Hearings were conducted in November, 1972, and an order
prohibiting further sales of naked options was issued in February, 1973. Also in February,
Washington, Oregon, California, and Maryland moved against options. See The Naked Option, supra
note 13, at 215-16.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-53 (1974).
49. SeeJohnson, supra note 44. See also 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, 471, at 82.383-.388.
50. SeeJohnson, supra note 44, at 8-19.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
dustry groups and trade organizations supplemented the expected
bureaucratic infighting.5 2 The jurisdictional fate of several com-
modity-related securities hinged on the outcome.5" Justification for
the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the CFTC varied with
regard to each different type of transaction.
In one of these areas, discretionary accounts, there was ample
justification for the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. This was
particularly true because the application of securities laws to
discretionary commodity futures accounts had always been con-
troversial and confusing. 54 Similarly, there was good reason for the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over exchange-traded commodity
options. The CFTC had always regulated the trading on com-
modity exchanges, and there was no need to impose additional
securities regulations on these comprehensively regulated ex-
changes.
While there was ample justification for the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction over these transactions, this was not true for naked op-
tions. 55 Naked commodity options were simply the tools chosen by
bucket shop operators. Commodities were involved only insofar as
they provided the underlying subject matter upon whose price fluc-
tuations the outcome could be determined. As Henry Jarecki ob-
served, naked options "could as well have involved wagers on the
temperature in Los Angeles or the whereabouts of Secretary
Kissinger. ' ' 56 Whatever justification there was for exclusive
regulation of naked options by the CFTC, it could not have been
logically based upon the connection of the devices to commodity
futures. Rather, the only logical justification had to rest on the
premise that the CFTC could do a better job of regulating such
transactions than the states or the SEC.
It should have been obvious that the CFTC could not do the
job the states and the SEC had done. Commodity options presented
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. These were discretionary commodity futures accounts, gold and silver margin contracts,
commodity forward contracts, naked options, and covered commodity options. 1 A. BROMBERG,
supra note 16, 400, at 82.101; Russo & Lyon, supra note 44, at 78-80.
54. Hodes & Dreyfos, Discretionary Trading Accounts In Commodity Futures-Are they Securities?, 30
Bus. LAW. 99 (1974); Russo & Lyon, supra note 44, at 78-79; Comment, Regulation of Commodity
RelatedAbuses, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 137, 159 (1975).
55. This was also true for sales of gold and silver on margin, or "leverage contracts." Leverage
contracts came into vogue soon after naked options flourished. Leverage contracts can be used with
the same felicity as naked options to fleece the public, although with less notoriety. See 1 A.
BROMBER, supra note 16, 415, at 82.141-.161.
56. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Hearings on S.2485, S.2578, S.2837, and H.R.
13,113, Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 800 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings].
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a regulatory problem which the federal commodity futures
regulator had never faced before. Federal regulation of commodity
futures markets has always been accomplished via commodity ex-
changes. Under the Commodity Exchange Act's scheme of self-
regulation, the role of federal regulation was to assure that the com-
modity exchanges adopted and enforced rules and regulations to
carry out the policies of the Commodity Exchange Act.57 Thus,
commodity exchanges were in essence the regulatory agencies by
which the law was administered. In contrast, commodity options
dealers have never really been a part of the commodity futures
community in the United States. In 1892, the Chicago Board of
Trade prohibited options.5 8 By the time commodity options were
banned by the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936, options were
already prohibited by the rules of many of the major exchanges. 59
Because the naked option dealers were outside the exchange
community, they were also outside the regulatory mechanism of the
Commodity Exchange Act. This meant that the generally passive
role of market surveillance and overseeing the exchanges, which
had always been ensconced in Chicago, New York, and Kansas
City, could not do the regulatory job. The commodity option
bucketeers were spread all over the country, in such exotic places as
California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Texas, and Michigan. If the
CFTC was to succeed in regulating options, it would have to go out
into the field, aggressively and without trade organization support.
This was a radical change from the federal commodity regulator's
traditionally passive role. Thus, while the regulation of naked
commodity options may have seemed to dovetail with the CFTC's
regulation of the commodity futures markets, the success of the
CFTC in dealing with these devices depended heavily upon a
radical change in policy and logistics. Considering the aversion in
human nature to radical change, it was questionable how soon an
agency fettered with fifty years of inertia would be able to adjust.
There was little in the history of federal regulation of the
commodity futures markets by the Commodity Exchange
Authority, the predecessor of the CFTC, to inspire confidence that
naked options would be effectively regulated. The Commodity Ex-
change Authority was a small, timorous, and ineffective agency,
57. See Ricci v. Chicago Merchantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 293-97 (1973) (outline of
regulatory scheme under the Commodity Exchange Act).
58. Hearings on Futures Trading Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 945, 949
(1921).
59. Hearings on H. R. 6772 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
220-21 (1936).
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even within its narrowly self-defined jurisdiction. 60 During the
Goldstein-Samuelson era, the naked option fraud had spread with a
virulence which the combined efforts of the states and the SEC had
barely been able to arrest.61 If commodity options had been a dif-
ficult problem for the states and the SEC, a fortiori it would be a
difficult one for the CFTC.
The states and the SEC had demonstrated, although belatedly,
the ability to put the naked option bucketeers out of business. This
should have been sufficient reason to leave well enough alone.
Despite the reasons for leaving the jurisdiction of the states and the
SEC over naked commodity options undisturbed, those who
participated in the Congressional hearings on the CFTCA were
oblivious to them. Early in the hearings, the emphasis was on filling
the regulatory gap by creating a strong regulatory agency
comparable to the SEC. 62 Exclusive jurisdiction was considered
essential to the CFTC's strength as an agency.
In subsequent hearings, the reason advanced for the CFTC's
need for exclusive jurisdiction was to avoid duplication and
potential conflict, particularly with the SEC. 6 3 Had the regulation
of naked options been considered as a separate problem, it would
have been obvious that there would have been no conflict in
keeping bucketeers out of business, since all governmental agencies
would have had the same objective. There is no evidence that the
legislative committees appreciated that they were tinkering with the
state-federal system of regulation which had worked for over fifty
years, much less realized the consequences of freeing the naked
option bucketeers from the control of the securities laws.
The only controversy which preemption generated centered
around the concerns of the SEC to preserve its jurisdiction.
Although concerned about the direction the legislation was taking,
the SEC never made a public presentation before the committees
which considered the various bills to amend the Act. Instead, the
SEC preferred to lobby behind the scenes. 64 The jousting of the
60. See N. MILLER, THE GREAT SALAD OIL SWINDLE 68 (1965), for a criticism of the Commodity
Exchange Authority for its passive role in the DeAngelis oil fraud. One of the main reasons for the
1974 amendments to create a strong federal regulatory agency was to remedy ineffectual regulation
which confidential governmental investigations had reported for years. In 1971, the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture had made an audit of the Commodity Exchange
Authority. This report analyzed the ineffectiveness of the agency in market surveillance. The report
was kept, as were others, for "official use only." 119711 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., Audit Report No. 5110-1-C.
61. Options Revisited, supra note 19, at 131.
62. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 56. These hearings took place in May, 1974.
63. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Hearings on H. R. 13,113, Before the Senate Comm. on
Agriculture andForestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). These hearings took place in September, 1974.
64. See I A. BROMBERC, supra note 16, 471, at 82.386.
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SEC and industry proponents manifested itself in a curious
logomachy between committee bills which preserved the
jurisdiction of the SEC and other bills which subordinated the
jurisdiction of the SEC to that of the CFTC.
65
. Provisions in the final version of the CFTCA grant the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction over all of the commodity related securities,
including naked options. 66 Thus, in an attempt to fill a regulatory
gap, which for naked options did not exist, Congress preempted the
states and the SEC and substituted the CFTC. As subsequent
events indicated, this substitution carved out the very gap which
Congress thought it had filled with regard to the sale of naked
options.
Although the CFTC did not regulate or ban options when it
came into existence, it lost no time in guarding its exclusive
jurisdiction to do so. In SEC v. American Commodity Exchange,67 the
SEC brought an action to enjoin violations of securities laws by
dealers in options, contending that commodity options were
investment contracts, and therefore securities. In a brief as amicus
.curiae, the CFTC argued that the CFTCA did not preclude action
by the SEC for violations which occurred before its enactment, but
implied that the SEC had no jurisdiction for violations occurring
after the 1974 legislation. 68 The CFTC announced a similar
position in its interpretative letters. 6
9
In the courts, defendants successfully contended that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC precluded actions under the
securities laws. In Texas v. Monex International, Ltd., 70 the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas upheld the dismissal of an action which had
been brought by the state securities commissioner to enjoin the
selling of leverage or margin contracts, on the ground that the
CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction. 71 Similarly, in SEC v. Univest,
Inc., 72 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
65. SeeJohnson, supra note 44, at 7-26.
66. See 7 U.S.C.A. 5 4a(a)-(j) (West 1980).
67. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,063 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
68. SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,063, at 20,680 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
69. Letter of CFTC Deputy to Central Security Administrator's Counsel, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,445 (1977) (expressing preemption of federal jurisdiction
over state jurisdiction in the regulation of commodity pool operators); CFTC Interpretative Letter
No. 76-20, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,214 (1976) (expressing
preemption of federal jurisdiction over state jurisdiction in the regulation of trading advisor); CFTC
Interpretative Letter No. 76-19, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,213
(1976) (expressing preemption of federal jurisdiction over state jurisdiction in the regulation of sale of
commodities).
70. 527 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
71. Texas v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., 527 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); accord,
International Trading Ltd. v. Bell, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,495 (Ark. 1977); Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer, 531 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1975).
72. 405 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Illinois dismissed a complaint by the SEC against a dealer in
commodity options, concluding that the CFTC had exclusive
jurisdiction .
7
Even as the CFTC was protecting its exclusive jurisdiction,
CFTC officials realized that they could use the help of state
securities officials. CFTC officials attempted to woo back state
officials, contending that states were not preempted in applying
their general anti-fraud statutes. 74  CFTC officials, however,
continued their refusal to acknowledge that the states and the SEC
had jurisdiction under securities laws over naked commodity
options. Although state officials may have been able to prosecute
naked option dealers under general criminal laws, the time and
expense involved in this type of prosecution, as opposed to
prosecuting the sale of unregistered securities, made state
participation unlikely.
75
E. RETURN OF THE BUCKETEERS
Because of the lack of regulations, the selling of options went
unregulated for seventeen months following the enactment of the
CFTCA. It was not until November of 1976, when the CFTC
adopted interim regulations, that sales of commodity options were
again regulated. 77 During this seventeen-month hiatus a new breed
of option dealers arose, whose fraudulent exploits far exceeded
those of the bucketeers of the Goldstein-Samuelson era.
The new option dealers were not only bucketeers, but were
"boiler room" bucketeers. "Boiler room" describes fraudulent,
high-pressure selling over the telephone by batteries of salespersons
in which random members of the public are pressured into making
hasty decisions to invest in obscure, speculative investments,
without regard to the suitability of the investment.7 8 Boiler rooms
tend to flourish in speculative periods, such as the stock market in
73. SEC v. Univest, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 (N.D. 11. 1975).
74. In an address in September, 1975, CFTC Vice-Chairman John Rainbolt stated, "We do
not believe that the states are preempted from prosecuting fraud under state laws of general
application. The important concept is that the fraud statute must be of general application and is not
part of some narrower state regulatory scheme." [1 975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,075, at 20,707. This position had also been stated in a Congressional report. See S. REP.
No. 73, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
75. See Russo & Lyon, supra note 44, at 71.
76. The only regulation adopted during this period was the general antifraud provision which
became effective in June, 1975. 17 C.F.R. S 30.02 (1980).
77. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,808-09. For the restrictions which currently apply to the sale of commodity
options, see 7 U.S.C.A. 5 6c(c) (West 1980).
78. See SEC v. R.J. Allen & Associates, 386 F. Supp. 866, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1974);
CONFERENCE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION 8, 69 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Mundheiml.
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the late 1950s and early 1960s.7 9 Securities sold by boiler rooms are
often obscure securities which are difficult to verify and which can
be acquired in large quantity. 80 Penny mining and uranium stocks,
oil and gas promotions, companies with new inventions, and
securities which catch the public fancy have traditionally been good
boiler room merchandise.8 1 Thus, commodity options were the
ideal merchandise for boiler room operators. Commodity futures
markets and commodity options were unknown to the general
public. The average person had no experience by which he could
evaluate what a salesman told him.
The new generation of option dealers began to emerge soon
after the CFTCA took effect in April, 1975.82 The matrix from
which boiler-room operators spawned was Miami, long notorious
as the confidence man's capital.83 Some of the boiler-room
operators were known to have been associated with persons in
organized crime. 
84
Crown Colony Optiohs typified the new generation of
commodity option dealers. The principals of Crown Colony, one of
whom was a three-time felon, had been running a land-sale racket
based in Miami under the name Property Resale Service, Inc. 85
After the land-sale racket had been shut down by an injunction,
Property Resale Service, Inc., changed its name to Crown Colony
Options Ltd., and became a London options firm.
86
Crown Colony operated out of offices which were used to sell
wigs and chemicals over the telephone during the day. The
building had as many as eighty telephones tied to a long distance
WATS facility, and a central monitoring system that allowed
supervisors to listen in on conversations or to broadcast such
conversations to other salesmen over a speaker system.
87
Crown Colony made no attempt to hire sales persons with any
knowledge of commodity markets. The objective of the boiler-room
operators was to sell options and not to give customers investment
advice. Crown Colony paid its salesmen a commission of ten
percent of the amount paid by a customer for an option.
Supervisors received a commission of ten percent on their own sales
79. Mundheim, supra note 78, at 8.
80. J. HAZARD & M. CHRISTIE, THE INVESTMENT BUSINESS, A CONDENSATION OF THE SEC
REPORT 62 (1964).
81. Id.
82. Options Revisited, supra note 19, at 131.
83. J. KWITNY, THE FOUNDATION PEN CONSPIRACY 286 (1973).
84. Kwitny, Commodity Options Sold by Phone Often Fail to Ring True, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1977, at
1, col. 4.
85. Id. at 41, col. 1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at col. 3.
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and an override of one-half percent on the sales of their salesmen.
Crown Colony pressured its salesmen to produce sales of $5,000
per week; salesmen who could not meet this quota were often
fired.8 8 As was typical of the boiler-room operators, Crown
Colony's sales campaign was "cold canvass"; salesmen solicited
strangers who had expressed no prior interest in purchasing
options. Lists of names and telephone numbers of prospective
customers were purchased from persons who specialized in selling
mailing lists.89
While bucketeers were busily plying their fraudulent wares to
the public, the CFTC was investigating the situation. In October of
1975, the CFTC established an advisory committee to study
whether options should be banned or allowed. 90 The chairman of
the advisory committee was John V. Rainbolt II, Vice-Chairman
of the CFTC. On the seventeen-member committee were "various
industry leaders, exchange officials, economists, attorneys, a state
securities commissioner, a farmer-rancher, and a customer
representative." 91 There were more persons from "industry than
the public, although the vast preponderance of members were not
from the option industry per se. "92
The report of the advisory committee was submitted onJuly 6,
1976. Initially, the members were divided over allowing options
trading. 93 When the report was submitted, however, only one
member dissented from the committee's recommendation that
options trading be allowed.
94
The advisory committee reasoned that the "key to solving
customer protection problems on options offered in the country was
to move such options to organized exchanges designated by the
Commission. Segregation of premiums, clearing mechanisms,
government and exchange surveillance and auditing procedures,
and competitive execution of transactions would, it was generally
felt, 'clean up' the industry and solve the problem." 9 5 Standing in
the way of this solution, however, was the concern that it would
have been anti-competitive to ban dealer options and restrict
trading to a "handful of contract markets designated by the
88. Id. at col. 2-3.
89. Id.
90. See Recommended Policies On Commodity Option Transactions, COMM. FUT. L. REP. CCH Report
No. 26, July 1976, at vii.
91. Id. at viii.
92. Id. at xiii.
93. Id. at viii.
94. Id. at 56.
95. Id. at xviii.
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Commission." ,96 If dealer options were banned, the committee was
concerned that this might be construed as prohibiting trading by
domestic dealers while allowing foreign offerings. 97
Because of what was viewed as the anti-competitiveness of
prohibiting dealer options but allowing exchange-traded options,
the committee concluded that off-exchange options had to be
allowed. In so doing, the advisory committee assumed that the
CFTC would be able to afford protections to customers equivalent
to those provided to futures customers on contract markets. These
protections included segregation of funds, a mechanism
guaranteeing performance of the transaction, and adequate
supervision and control of trading practices. 98 The advisory
committee envisioned that bank guarantees could be an adequate
substitute for segregation of funds and performance of the
transactions, and that a self-regulatory organization could fulfill a
supervisory role. The committee also suggested that account
insurance would help in protecting customers who purchased off-
market options. 99 Primarily because of its faith in regulatory
safeguards, 00 the committee concluded by recommending strict
regulatory control, rather than the more authoritarian approach of
a complete ban on options trading.
The one member who dissented from the committee's
96. Id. at xxiii.
97. Id. at xxiv.
98. Id. at xxv.
99. Id.
100. The committee concluded by stating:
In dealing with the commodity option issue the Commission could find precedent
in the statutory ban on options on the "previously regulated" commodities and, citing
the various problems associated with options through the years, extend that ban to the
"new" commodities brought under federal regulation by the CFTC Act. No doubt
there are those who would approve such a ban and, admittedly, it would require
considerably fewer Commission resources to police than would a regulatory system
allowing option trading.
However, before we exercise a natural desire to look for simple solutions, such as
banning options, the Commission should be mindful of the success of those who have
used such solutions in the past. The authoritarian approach (i.e., banning one or
another aspect of legitimate economic behavior) has not necessarily proven, in every
case, to be the most successful or correct course when interpreted in the light of
history. Properly enforced, with intelligent interpretation of the structure envisioned
by the Committee for off-contract market trading, the requirements recommended
offer a positive plan that represents a substantial step forward from past governmental
approaches regarding commodity option trading.
It is probably time to see if we can bring commodity options in from the cold. If
applied through a designation process, and interpreted in the light of the
Commission's "public interest" test currently applied to futures contracts, and
implemented initially in the form of a pilot program for exchange options, the
Committee's recommendations for strict regulation should provide an adequate
structure to support trading in a market instrument that in one form or another has
been seeking the favor of commercial and speculative interests over a hundred years.
Id. at xxviii.
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recommendation, Rodney E. Leonard, criticized the committee for
having decided the regulatory terms and conditions under which
options trading should be allowed before deciding .whether option
trading, as a whole, served any beneficial function.1"' Leonard
correctly assessed the industry bias of the advisory committee's
report. The report could have been paraphrased from the statement'
committee member HenryJarecki had made before the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry during its hearings on the Commodity
Exchange Act. 102
In November of 1976, the CFTC adopted interim rules for the
101. Mr. Leonard stated:
What the Committee has done is recommend the conditions under which dealers
in commodity options must operate, whether on or off a regulated exchange. The
Committee argues that these safeguards are adequate to protect those who deal with
commodity option traders. These conditions, however, are porous safeguards, since
the Commission is going to have a difficult time with its limited staff in policing these
transactions where they occur away from a regulated exchange. The standards are not
safeguards as they are an attempt to assure competitive parity to futures merchants
who fear that option trading will compete unfairly with the more conventional futures
trading.
Id. at 57-58.
102. The following quote from Dr. Jarecki's statement before the United States Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry expresses the same ideas as the advisory committee report:
It has been argued that, in view of the severe losses suffered by members of the
public resulting from the failures of numerous commodity option issuers in recent
years, commodity options should be prohibited as clearly and swiftly as possible to
avoid further such frauds. According to this theory, the evils of commodity option
dealing have been shown to be so severe that the burden of justifying the existence of
commodity options should now be shifted; that is, outlaw them until somebody can
prove to Congress that the business can be done legitimately. This position is tempting
in its simplicity but it is very incorrect.
The Honorable Brian Van Camp, Commissioner of Corporations of the State of
California, is perhaps the man whose regulatory objectives have been most upset by
the spate of fraudulent commodity option dealing in recent years, and the man who
has demonstrated the most constructive and realistic approach to solving the problems
of this kind of dealing. I offer his words in closing:
I do have a philosophical persuasion which would lead me to be slow to
outlaw any business operation which is basically fair and which fully discloses
the risks involved to the customers.
To do otherwise, I am afraid, that is to outlaw a legitimate activity simply
because another investment opportunity would be more prudent to society, I
am afraid goes too far. Going to the logical extreme, I am afraid this kind of
prohibition could conceivably give justification for prohibiting investment in
all but the bluest of blue chip corporate securities in this country.
Therefore, I think our only basis for outlawing the commodity option is a
finding of inherent fraud; that is, a finding that there is no way to operate this
kind of program for the long pull and still pay off the option holders on
exercise. As of this date, . . . I am afraid I haven't seen the proof in this
industry of this kind of inherent fraud or inherent inability to pay off.
Therefore, I could not recommend at this time a total prohibition of the
commodities option activity.
Transcript of Testimony before the United States Department of Agriculture in the Matter of Trading of Puts and
Calls on Non-Regulated Commodities, Feb. 14, 19.73, at 22. See Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and
H.R. 131l7, Before the Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 801, 807 (1974)
(statement of Dr. Henry. J..arecki).
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regulation of commodity options. 103 In the words of the CFTC, the
interim regulations were intended to allow legitimate enterprises to
write options with certain protection to customers until a
comprehensive regulatory structure for all commodity options
could be developed and implemented. 10 4 The interim regulations
prohibited an option dealer from doing business after January 17,
1977, unless the dealer was registered as a futures commission
merchant under the Act.10 5 To be registered, a dealer had to
maintain minimum capital which was the greater of either $50,000
or a mathematical formula specified in the regulation. 
106
The interim regulations required that a customer be given a
''summary disclosure statement" before a commodity option
transaction.1 0 7 The statement had to disclose the total quantity and
quality of the commodity under option, its duration, the elements
of the purchase price, the method used to arrive at the striking
price, the amount of commission charged, a statement that the
price rise (for a call) or price fall (for a put) must exceed the
premium amount plus fees if the holder is to make money, and a
clear explanation of the possible effects of currency fluxuation on
options executed on foreign facilities. 10 8 The interim regulations
required the segregation in a domestic bank of ninety percent of the
payment received from a customer until exercise or expiration of an
option. 10 9 The regulations also required that records of each
transaction be kept. 1 10
Although the interim regulations were similar in effect to the
registration and disclosure requirements of the securities laws,
there was a fundamental difference between the Goldstein-
Samuelson era bucket shops and those which prospered under the
interim regulations. The Goldstein-Samuelson era dealers had
always been outlaws; once it became recognized that commodity
options were securities, they were forced to halt their operations.
The Goldstein-Samuelson era dealers knew that it was either stop
selling options or go to jail.
The new generation of federally allowed options dealers,
however, had never been outlaws. Moreover, by the time the
CFTC adopted the interim regulations, the options dealers had
103. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,808 (1976).
104. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,808-09 (1976).
105. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,814-15 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. S 32.2 (1976)).
106. 41 Fed. Reg. 3194 (1976)(codified at 17 CF.R. S 1.17 (1976)).
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,815-16 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. S 32.5 (1976)).
108. Id.
109. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,815-16 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 32.6 (1976)).
110. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,815-16 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. S 32.7 (1976)).
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been lawfully ensconced in business for over seventeen months.
When the CFTC began enforcing the interim regulations, it faced
well-entrenched adversaries who were not about to fold up their
tents and slink off into the night. With the largest dealers reportedly
taking irr as much as two million dollars per month, the option
dealers had the finances to wage a war of dilatory litigation.
The bucketeers wasted little time in attacking the CFTC's
attempts at regulation. In Citadel Trading Co. v. Bagley, It' a dealer
brought an action to enjoin the CFTC from investigating its
activities, claiming that the appointment of the acting executive
director of the CFTC had not been submitted to the Senate for
confirmation. 112 In Lucas v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 113
a registered, associated employee of Lloyd, Carr & Co., one of the
most notorious "boiler room" operations, brought an action
contending that the CFTC had been responsible for an erroneous
news report. 114 The report indicated that the CFTC had taken
official action against registered associates, such as the plaintiff,
who continued their affiliation with unregistered futures
commission merchants, such as Lloyd, Carr & Co. Although the
report was in error, the court dismissed the action, finding no
evidence that the CFTC had been responsible for the report.
115
Although these brabbles could hardly have been taken seriously,
they helped in the bucketeers' war of attrition against the CFTC.
The option dealers also made concerted attacks on the
enforcement of the interim regulations, especially the regulation
requiring the segregation of ninety percent of the money received
from customers, artfully labeled "double segregation." Displaying
the American propensity for organized groups, the option dealers
formed the National Association of Commodity Options Dealers
(N.A.C.O.D.) late in 1976.116 N.A.C.O.D. and nine individual
dealers brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin the CTFC from enforcing
the interim regulations.117 The court enjoined the enforcement of
the segregation regulation,118 finding that the interim regulations as
111. 440F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
112. Citadel Trading Co. v. Bagley, 440 F. Supp. 925, 926 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
113. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,493 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
114. Lucas v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,493, at
21,989 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
115. Id.
116. Evaluating Commodity Options Terms - Some Views On Trading Approaches, COMMODITIES, Dec.
1976, at 22.
117. British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. 20,245 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
118. Id. at 21,334.
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originally proposed had no segregation requirement and
that there was no reason for the hasty addition of the segregation
rule. 119 The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs had a
reasonable likelihood of success in establishing that the CFTC had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in imposing the segregation
requirement. 120 Although the decision invalidating the segregation
regulation was a dysnomy, the decision nevertheless caused the
CFTC to publicly announce that it did not intend to enforce the
regulation pending the outcome of a motion for reconsideration. 121
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court decision granting the injunction
against the segregation regulation. 122 The court concluded that the
segregation regulation had not been adopted hastily and was not
unreasonable. 123 In view of the CFTC's power to ban option
trading altogether, 124 the court decided that the segregation
requirement was a reasonable exercise of discretion, 125 even if it did
"restrict participation in the industry to soundly capitalized
firms. '126
A substantial amount of the CFTC's resources were exhausted
in actions to enforce the interim regulations. 127 The efforts spent in
regulating options so debilitated the CFTC that it was unable to
effectively carry out many of its other regulatory duties. 12
8
Most of the option dealers simply ignored the regulations. As
the CFTC sought to enforce the interim rules, the agency found
119. Id. at 21,331-32.
120. Id. at 21,332.
121. CFTC Release No. 232-76 (Dec. 22, 1976).
122. British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 938 (1977).
123. Id. at 490-91.
124. 7 U.S.C.A. S 6c(b) (West 1980).
125. 552 F.2d at 490-91.
126. Id. at 490.
127. See 43 Fed. Reg. 16,155 (1978).
128, At a seminar at the University of Santa Clara in July of 1977, CFTC Chairman Bagley
stated:
CFTC computations show that work in the options field, occupied by an
inordinate number of fly-by-night hustlers, is now consuming about 20 percent (18.9
percent to be exact) of our operating time and personnel. We simply can't swallow
that and at the same time properly regulate trading in the futures markets - our
primary duty and concern.
We are, for example, almost one year behind in auditing brokers. We are months
behind in exchange contract review and exchange rule review. We are weeks behind in
processing salesperson registration. And we can barely keep up with the daily
surveillance of the trading in half a hundred commodities on the ten domestic
exchanges.
Additionally, we have deferred or dropped a large number of customer fraud,
fictitious trading, and potential manipulation investigations, because we have only 26
professional investigators nationwide.
CFTC Release No. 316-77 (July 27, 1977).
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itself sinking deeper and deeper into a morass of litigation. By the
spring of 1978, the agency had instituted thirteen formal
administrative actions and fifteen injunctive actions against
commodity option dealers. 129 The CFTC had obtained injunctions'
against sixty firms and individuals. 130 At least forty of these
injunctions were to enjoin further violations of the anti-fraud rule
governing options. Yet, despite these efforts, thirty of the thirty-
eight firms which were selling options in the spring of 1978 were
under investigation for violation of the interim regulations. 31 The
frustration of the CFTC is evidenced by the following statement of
a CFTC official:
How far can Big Brother government go in
protecting somebody who gets a phone call from
somebody he never heard of halfway across the country
who says, "Send me a check tonight and I'll quadruple
your money," and he sends it and never hears from his
money again? Is it right to charge some farmer in Fergus
Falls, Minnesota, $8,900 for a London option that sells
for $2,200? It isn't against the law.
132
CFTC officials blamed the courts for the agency's inability to
enforce the regulations. 13 3 But the difficulties the CFTC had in
enforcement were brought on itself. The CFTC expected the courts
to immediately close down what the CFTC belatedly recognized as
criminal operations. The federal judges who rebuffed the CFTC
enforcement efforts, however, did not see the boiler room operators
as criminals. They viewed the options dealers as the CFTC had
initially protrayed them - as businessmen who were recalcitrant to
comply with burdensome regulations.
F. SELLING OF DEALER OPTIONs BANNED
The more effort the CFTC directed toward enforcement of the
129.43 Fed. Reg. 16,154 (1978).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Kwitny, supra note 84, at 41, col. 4.
133. In May of 1978, CFTC Chairman William T. Bagley stated:
We have helped establish a "public institution" atmosphere and have helped bring
true self-regulation nearer to reality. Even in the options area, with our hands tied
behind our backs by Congress and the Courts, we have done our share to stop
burgeoning customer fraud and to ready a new and innovative exchange-traded
options program.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
interim regulations, the more the futility of these efforts became
apparent. For example, after the CFTC had labored in court for a
year to put the Miami office of British American Commodity
Options Corporation out of business, its phone operation was
simply sold to First Regal Commodities, Inc. First Regal's
salesmen immediately began calling the victims of British
American to con them into buying new options to recoup their
losses. 134
In the beginning, the CFTC had justified its decision not to
ban commodity options on the grounds that an outright prohibition
would have been the epitome of government overregulation.135 By
mid-1977, the CFTC indicated that continued regulation depended
upon Congress's willingness to increase the CFTC budget by one-
and-a-half million dollars, enough for fifty to sixty additional
employees. 136 When Congress mercifully denied the request for
additional money, it could be remembered that Congress and not
the CFTC had been responsible for a policy which eventually
resulted in a complete ban. However, any hope the CFTC had of
gracefully extricating itself from its initial decision to regulate,
rather than prohibit, options trading ended in frustration and
national attention. In addition to the frustration the CFTC was
suffering in the courts, the public was rapidly becoming aware of
the massive frauds involving the option dealers. The improprieties
of the bucketeers and the failure of the CFTC to curtail them was
widely and derisively reported in the newspapers and on the
nationally televised program "60 Minutes. "137
On February 6, 1978, the CFTC published its proposal to
suspend any further sale of options. 1 38  After conducting the
necessary hearings, the CFTC, on April 17, 1978, issued a
regulation banning the sale of options.139  In its report
accompanying the regulations, the CFTC admitted: "The Com-
mission has invested a substantial portion of its resources in an
Letter to John V. Rainbolt from William T. Bagley upon Mr. Rainbolt's resignation from the
CFTC (May 8, 1978).
134. Kwitny, supra note 84, at 41, col. 3.
135. When the CFTC directed its staff to draft the interim regulations in September of 1976,
CFTC Chairman Bagley stated, "The easy way would have been to ban the trading of options and
not to regulate them at all, but that would have been the epitome of over-regulation." CFTC Release
No. 198-76 (Sept. 13, 1976).
136. SeeCFTC Release No. 316-77 (July 27, 1977).
137. Schneider, The Carr Case. The Straw That Broke the Camel's Back, COMMODITIES, Mar. 1978,
at 37.
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,161 (1978) (currently codified at 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1980)). The validity
of section 32.11 has been upheld on at least two occasions. Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258
(7th Cir. 1978); Chartered Systems of N.Y., Ltd. v. Seevers, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,682 (D.D.C. 1978).
139.43 Fed. Reg. 16,161 (currently codified at 17 C.F.R. S 32.11 (1980)).
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attempt to control dealer and foreign option sales under the interim
regulations. The adoption of a suspension has been necessary
because the Commission has been unable to do so."'" Thus came
the ignominious end to the CFTC's efforts to regulate the sale of
commodity options to the general public.
At about the same time as the CFTC was adopting a
regulation to suspend the further sale of options, 14 1 a CFTC
reauthorization bill was being reported out of committees of the
House and the Senate. 142 This bill provided an exemption for
options granted by trade dealers who were in the business of
buying, selling, or using the commodity underlying the option. 
143
On May 11, 1978, Mocatta Metals Corporation and Metals
Quality Corporation petitioned the CFTC to amend section 32.11
of the Code of Federal Regulations to allow firms which could meet
conditions for the protection of the public to continue to offer and
sell options on physical commodities, the so-called dealer
options. 14 4 They proposed regulations to exempt dealer options
which were similar in substance to exemptions in the bill pending in
Congress.1 4 5 Anticipating that Congress would adopt legislation to
exempt dealer options from the ban on options trading, the CFTC
adopted section 32.12.146 Section 32.12 generally provided that the
ban on options under section 32.11 did not apply to the purchase
or sale of any commodity option on a physical commodity granted
by a dealer in the business of granting options on a physical
commodity, and in the business of buying, selling, producing, or
otherwise using that commodity. A dealer approved under this
exemption was required to have a net worth of ten million
dollars. 147 To screen out the bucketeers, section 32.12 provided that
persons convicted of crimes involving securities or commodities
within the previous ten years, or who had been enjoined from
engaging in securities or commodities activity, could not sell
options.148  Other requirements of section 32.12 included
segregation of profits over premiums, account identification,
140.43 Fed. Reg. 16,159 (1978).
141.43 Fed. Reg. 21,022 (1978).
142. S. 2391, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The bill was eventually passed. Futures Trading Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (currently codified in scattered sections of 7, 18 U.S.C.).
143. S. 2391, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
144. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,023 (1978). The petition was filed under a Commission regulation which
provides that any person may file a petition with the Commission for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal ofa rule ofgeneral application. 17 C.F.R. S 13.2 (1980).
145. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,023-25. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
146. 43 Fed. Reg. 23,704-08 (1978) (currently codified at 17 C.F.R. S 32.12 (1980)).
147. The current code calls only for a net worth of one million dollars. See 17 C.F.R.
32.12(a)(1) (1980).
148. 17 C.1F.R. § 32.12(a)(7)(i)-(ii) (1980).
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confirmations, and various other reports. 149
On October 1, 1978, the Futures Trading Act of 1978 became
effective.1 50 The 1978 Act bears the scars of the CFTC's defeat by
the bucketeers. Section 3 of the Act amended section 4c of the
Commodity Exchange Act to ban the sale of options other than
those sold by dealers in the trade, thereby making the CFTC's
regulatory exception a permanent statutory fixture. 151
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF LEVERAGE
CONTRACTS
The ban on the sale of commodity options, except by dealers of
a prescribed net worth, ended the options scandal. But this did not
put an end to the bucketeers. After the CFTC banned the sale of
options in 1977, the bucketeers merely altered their operations and
began selling leverage contracts. 1
52
Leverage contracts are contracts in which a customer buys a
commodity by paying to a dealer a percentage of the full contract
value, termed "margin", in consideration for an agreement by a
dealer to sell and deliver the commodity at the contracted price.
Although the form and terminology of leverage contracts differs
from options, there is not much difference in substance between
commodity options and leverage contracts. In both transactions the
customer pays a sum of money for the chance to profit from a
change in price during the term of the contract. It is understood
that a customer does not have to accept delivery but can close out
the transaction for the difference between the contract price and the
future market price of the commodity. In both options and leverage
contracts, dealers need not actually purchase the commodity
contracted for, but supposedly cover their obligations by hedging
on the futures market or by contracting with others. Because
parties to leverage contracts generally do not intend to perform by
delivery, leverage contracts are illegal under state bucket shop and
gambling statutes. 53
Leverage contracts are also securities under state and federal
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 32.12(a)-(h)(1980).
150. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (currently codified in
scattered sections of 7, 18 U.S.C.).
151. 7 U.S.C.A. 56c(c) (West 1980).
152. Letter from William T. Bagley, Chairman ofCFTC, to Harold M. Williams, Chairman of
SEC (May 24, 1978), reprinted in CFTC Release No. 406-78 (May 25, 1978); Letter from William T.
Bagley, Chairman of CFTC, to State Attorneys General and Securities Commissioners (May 25,
1978), reprinted in CFTC Release No. 406-78 (May 25, 1978).
153. See supra note 1 and sources cited therein.
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law. As with commodity options, the value of a leverage contract
depends upon whether the dealer has covered his obligation. This
in turn ultimately depends upon whether the obligations of other
customers have been covered, since the margin money is treated as
belonging-to the dealer to spend at his discretion. Thus, leverage
contracts are just as susceptible to fraudulent practice as
commodity options. 154 The SEC and state securities officials had
previously regulated leverage contracts under the securities laws. 155
Congress, however, put an end to the campaign of the SEC and
state officials by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC. 156
The sale of leverage contracts was not one of the problems
which had attracted the attention of those who were behind the
1974 legislation. 157 Leverage contracts would not even have been
covered by the CFTCA if it had not been for the testimony of
Martin Rom, Chairman of the Board of International Precious
Metals Corporation, a leverage contract dealer. He was the last
witness to testify before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry.1 58 Describing leverage contracts as a "form of contract
for future delivery" of a commodity, Rom urged that all such
contracts be governed exclusively under the CFTCA rather than by
other federal and state agencies.159 A few days later, International
Precious Metals submitted a proposal to the Senate Committee
which, with a few changes, became section 217 of the CFTCA. 160
Although the CFTCA gave the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
over leverage contracts, the CFTC never attempted to regulate
154. See supra note 1 and sources cited therein.
155. See, e.g., Jenson v. Continental Financial Corp., 404 F. Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975);
People v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 820, 380 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1975); Note, Securities Regulation:
Coin and Bullion Investment Programs - The Newest Security?, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 433 (1975).
156. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6a(1)-(4) (West 1980).
157. H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1974).
158. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R.
13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 748-54 (1974)
(statement of M. Martin Rom).
159. Id. at 751-52.
160. 7 U.S.C. S 15a (1976) (originally enacted as Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 5 217, 88 Stat. 1389) (currently codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 23 (West
1980)). See infra notes 161-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolution of this statute.
Section 217 provided in pertinent part:
No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execution of any
transaction for the delivery of silver bullion, gold bullion, or bulk silver coins or bulk
gold coins, pursuant to the standardized contract commonly known to trade as a
margin account, margin contract, leverage account, or leverage contract contrary to
any rule of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission designed to insure the
financial solvency of the transaction or prevent manipulation or fraud: Provided, . . . .
If the Commission determines that any such transaction is a contract for future
delivery within the meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, such
transaction shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of such Act.
Id. See Greenstone, Leverage Transactions: On Creating a Regulatory Theme, 27 EMORY L.J. 909, 917
(1978).
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
them. On June 17, 1975, the CFTC adopted section 30.02 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, 161 a general anti-fraud rule copied
from rule 10-b5162 under the Securities Exchange Act. An advisory
committee chaired by CFTC Vice-Chairman Rainbolt was formed
to study, among other things, the prohibition of regulation of
leverage contracts. 163 On August 20, 1975, the CFTC proposed an
interim regulation to require persons selling leverage contracts, as
described in section 217, to comply with a business plan submitted
to and approved by the CFTC. The business plan would have
required dealers to disclose their identities, background, finances,
the payment necessary to maintain a customer's interest, and
procedures for covering obligations, including insurance and
depository used. 164 The CFTC never acted on this proposal. 
16 5
On July 16, 1976, the advisory committee submitted a report
to the Commission. With one dissent, the committee recommended
that leverage contracts should not be prohibited, that they should
not be treated as futures contracts nor regulated as such, and that
the CFTC should adopt regulations to govern leverage contracts. 
166
Rodney E. Leonard dissented on the ground that leverage contracts
were inherently fraudulent because they served no economic
purpose. ' 67  The advisory committee recommended dealer
registration, minimum net worth and working capital
requirements, segregation of funds, and one hundred percent
coverage in futures of the actual commodity. 168 A month after
receiving this report, the CFTC recommended to Congress that
section 217 of the CFTCA be incorporated into the Commodity
Exchange Act so that the enforcement provisions of the Act would
be fully applicable to leverage transactions. 1
69
On October 12, 1976, the CFTC, by a three-to-two vote,
decided that leverage contracts were not futures contracts, and
directed the staff to draft interim regulations. 70 Being preoccupied
with the commodity option bucketeers, the CFTC did nothing
about leverage contracts until November 8, 1977, when it
established a task force to study the leverage contract business and
161. 17C.F.R. 5 30.02 (1980).
162. 17C.F.R. $240.10b-5 (1980).
163. 40 Fed. Reg. 26,504 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 32,866 (1975).
164. Proposed Section 30.00, reprinted in COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 3425 (1975).
165. Greenstone, supra note 160, at 929.
166. Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Instruments to the CFTC, Recommended Policies on
Futures, Forward and Leverage Contracts and Transactions 23-49 (July 16, 1976).
167. Id. at 50-52.
168. Id. at 23-49.
169. COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) Report No. 29, Aug. 20, 1976, at 3.
170. COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) Report No. 33, Oct. 22, 1976, at 2.
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report its finding. 17 1
The year of reckoning for the CFTC was 1978. Section 12(d)
of the Commodity Exchange Act, a "sunset" provision included in
the CFTCA, authorized Congress to appropriate funds only
through fiscal year 1978. Without legislative reauthorization, the
CFTC would cease to exist. Public criticism of the CFTC's
inability to deal with the commodity option scandals had also been
building. 172  During hearings of a Senate subcommittee on
appropriations in 1977, after CFTC Chairman Bagley explained
that the Commission had decided not to ban commodity options
because that would have been the "epitome of over-regulation,"
Senator Eagleton replied: "Would the vitals of democracy be
violated if we outlaw options? What worthwhile humanitarian
civilized purpose do options serve if they are subject to
manipulation; if there has been shystering, the democracy won't
crumble without them.' 1 73 Senator Bellmon warned: "Why sit
around and wait until we have a scandal before we do something? I
agree with our chairman, if you can't properly regulate options, I
say put them out of business until you can. ",174
The reauthorization hearings began on February 12, 1978,
before a House subcommittee. 175 During the hearings, the CFTC
revealed that it had reversed its earlier position and had decided to
recommend that Congress repeal section 217.176 The CFTC's
position was based on the differing function of exchange and
leverage transactions, the absence of exchange control over
leverage contracts, and the move of option bucketeers into leverage
contracts following the 1978 ban on the sale of commodity
options. 177 The CFTC argued that leverage transactions would be
better regulated by agencies administering securities laws because
those agencies already had standards applicable to off-exchange
transactions. 178
During the hearings, however, the position stated by the
CFTC's report was undermined by testimony of commissioners.
CFTC Chairman Bagley alternatively suggested that leverage
171. COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) Report No. 61, Nov. 21, 1977, at 3.
172. See Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 854, 864 (1978).
173. Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture and
RelatedAgencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1262 (1977).
174. Id. at 1263.
175. See Extended Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the Subcomm. on
Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
176. Id. at 69-71.
177. Id. at69.
178. Id. at 70.
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contracts be banned or that the jurisdiction of the CFTC be
expanded to adequately regulate them. 17 9 The CFTC Chairman
indicated that his preference was for an expansion of Commission
activity in the area. 
180
Following these comments, Vice-Chairman Rainbolt
concluded with an appeal which was realistic but not likely to have
gained the sympathy of exasperated Congressmen:
Making a judgment between the nine firms or so that are
trading this type of instrument and the overall
responsibilities that the Commission has - our problems
with jurisdictional issues, the reauthorization issue, the
question of futures, the question of options - frankly, I
think the judgment was made by the Commission that
leverage was not worth the trouble we were going through
in trying to define it. Therefore, I think we are coming
back to you and asking you to take us off the hook.' 8
The CFTC's position that its jurisdiction over leverage
contracts should be repealed aroused the wrath of International
Precious Metals Corporation, the firm which had been responsible
for the adoption of section 217. To repeal section 217, the firm
argued, would have reopened the federal regulatory gap which
existed prior to the enactment of the 1974 Act. If section 217 were
repealed, the leverage contract industry would be subject to fifty
different state securities regulations, as well as federal regulation:
the proposed solution was to expand the scope of section 217 to
cover all leverage contracts. 1
8 2
State securities officials testified that the exclusive jurisdiction
of the CFTC inhibited their ability to deal with the commodity
options fraud which was allowed to exist in principle through
leverage contracts. 183 The Committee reacted to this testimony by
granting state officials the authority to bring civil actions for
violations of section 217 or CFTC regulations concerning off-
exchange transactions. 1
8 4
The Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry had been considering the CFTC's initial recommendation
that section 217 be incorporated into the Commodity Exchange Act
179. Id. at 654.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 656.
182. Id. at 728-29.
183. H.R. REP. No. 95-1181,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1978).
184. Id. at 136-37.
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as a new section.8 5 The bill reported out of this committee
prohibited leverage contracts on commodities regulated under the
Commodity Exchange Act before the CFTCA, and authorized the
CFTC to prohibit or regulate leverage transactions for all other
commodities by October 1, 1979.186 The overriding concern of the
committee was to fill in the gaps in the regulation of commodity
options. The committee cited the CFTC's warning that leverage
contracts could become a "new field of speculative activity and
deceptive sales practices.' 81 7 The Senate considered and rejected
an amendment proposed by Senator Bellmon to ban all leverage
transactions. 8
During the hearings before various committees, Congress was
moving toward expanding the jurisdiction of the CFTC over all
leverage contracts, while the CFTC was retracting toward the
position that leverage contracts were futures contracts which should
only be traded on designated contract markets. 1 9 The CFTC was
too late, however, to influence the legislation. The Futures Trading
.Act of 1978 (FTA) combined the Senate and House bills into a new
section 19, which expanded the CFTC's jurisdiction over all
leverage transactions. Section 19 prohibited leverage transactions
on commodities described in section 2(a) of the Commodity
Exchange Act before 1974, required the CFTC to regulate gold and
silver bullion and bulk coins, authorized the CFTC to prohibit or
regulate all other leverage transactions by October 1, 1979, and
authorized the CFTC to regulate leverage contracts as futures
contracts under the Commodity Exchange Act. 190
The CFTC has in fact done little to deal with the problem of
leverage contracts since passage of the FTA. On March 12, 1979,
the CFTC published a proposal to either classify leverage contracts
as futures contracts or adopt comprehensive regulations. 191 The
comprehensive regulations would include registration, net working
capital requirements, segregation of customer's funds, disclosure,
and record-keeping requirements. 192 On July 10, 1979, the
185. Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearings on S. 2391 Before the
Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 627 (1978).
186. S. 2391, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 19, 124 CONG. REC. 10 533 (1978).
187. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 3817, 3823.
188. Id. at 27, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWs 3817, 3845.
189. See Greenstone, supra note 160, at 941-46.
190. See H.R. REP. No. 1678, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWs 3906, 3918.
191. Proposed Statute 44 Fed. Reg. 13494 (Mar. 12, 1979): Regulation of Leverage Transactions as
Contracts for Future Delivery, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,772
(1979).
192. Id. at 23,162-63.
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CFTC announced that leverage transactions for the delivery of
silver bullion, gold bullion, bulk silver coins, or bulk gold coins
which were being offered to the public for future delivery were
contracts for future delivery and were to be regulated as such.
193
This regulation took effect onJune 30, 1980.194
The CFTC's approach to the problem may well lead to a dead
end. It is difficult to view leverage contracts as equivalents of
futures contracts. Although leverage and futures contracts are alike
in having a futurity of delivery, this general characteristic does not
justify similar regulatory treatment. Commodity futures trading is
distinguished by exchange procedures which assure that
commodity futures contracts will be performed. The performance
of commodity futures contracts is guaranteed by margin, which
must be deposited and maintained by parties to commodity futures
contracts. Margin is administered by clearinghouses. This
elaborate system for guaranteeing performance imparts a validity
to commodity futures trading which is unique. This is the reason
courts and state legislatures exempted commodity futures trading
from the application of statutes prohibiting bucketing and
gambling. 195 Even with these special circumstances, commodity
futures trading was only grudgingly excepted from the general
prohibition of wagers. Indeed, the exception of commodity futures
trading from the general rule against wagers was never completely
resolved until the CFTCA preempted state law. 196
The CFTC's classification of leverage contracts as futures
contracts rests solely on administrative expediency. Clearly this
was not the intent behind the passage of the FTA, as Congress
granted the CFTC authority to classify leverage contracts as futures
contracts only if the Commission determined that leverage
transactions were in fact contracts for future delivery. 197
The situation is ironic. After five years of dealing with
commodity options and leverage contracts, the CFTC has finally
learned the bitter lesson that these transactions are not worth
regulating. But by its ineptitude in attempting to do so, the CFTC
has so destroyed its credibility with Congress that it dare not do
what it knows should be done, for fear of being viewed as shirking
193. 44 Fed. Reg. 44,177 (1979).
194. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,304 (1979); Postponement of Effective Date of Regulation of Leverage Transactions
as Futures Contracts (Dec. 3, 1979), [1977-1980 Transfer Binder COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,929
(1980).
195. See Comment, Legislation Affecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARV. L. REV. 912
(1932).
196. See supra note 35.
197. 7 U.S.C.A. 5 23(d) (West 1980). For a statement on congressional intent, see H.R. REP.
No. 1628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3906, 3919.
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its duty.
Even if the CFTC is able to prevail in classifying leverage
contracts as futures contracts, it still will not have dealt with the
basic problem - what to do about the bucketeers. As in the past,
the bucketeers will fade into other types of merchandise if leverage
contracts become too difficult to sell, or will continue their
bucketeering under the guise of complying with whatever
regulations the CFTC chooses to promulgate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal government has failed to deal with the problem of
the bucketeers because federal officials have not seen commodity
options, leverage contracts, and other such contracts for what they
are - bucket shop merchandise. It does not matter by what name
this merchandise is called, whether it be commodity options,
leverage contracts, margin contracts, or forward contracts.
Regardless of the name, the substance of the transaction is the
same: a bet on the future price of a commodity.
The elementary lore of regulation teaches that one should deal
with bucket shops by eradication. 198 This is only common sense.
Regulation must depend on those who are regulated having some
incentive to comply. A legitimate brokerage has the incentive of
being able to continue as a lawful business enterprise. The
principals of a legitimate brokerage will have too much invested to
jeopardize their investment by running a bucket shop or boiler
room. This is why members of an organization such as the London
Metals Exchange will adhere to a code of ethics even though it is
unwritten. 199
But a bucketeer is beyond regulatory redemption. A bucket
shop is a fraud which will run its course, either because the police
are willing and able to close it down, or because its victims
eventually discover its true nature. Bucketeers have no incentive to
comply with regulations; indeed, they have every incentive not to
comply. There is no reason to assume that the bucketeers will cease
defrauding the public by becoming part of the system for regulating
commodity futures contracts.
The CFTC still suffers from a lack of ensynopticity which it
has labored under from the beginning. Instead of doing something
about the bucketeers which have proliferated under the aegis of
198. See HAZARD & CHRISTIE, supra note 80, at 63.
199. GIBSON-JARVIE, supra note 1, at 22.
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federal law, the CFTC is nibbling away with its shilpit proposal to
treat leverage contracts as futures contracts. If the leverage contract
problem is understood for what it is - a problem of dealing with
bucketeers - the policy becomes self-evident. There can be only
one policy - to eliminate the bucket shops. For the present, the
CFTC should adopt regulations aimed at impeding bucket shop
operations. These regulations should include stringent fitness and
financial requirements. Above all, the CFTC should make it
unlawful for those selling bucket shop merchandise to receive
money paid by customers before obligations to customers have
been met. These anti-bucketeering regulations should apply
universally to leverage contracts, margin contracts, forward
contracts, or any other transaction which is susceptible to
bucketeering. Finally, these regulations should be enforceable by
criminal prosecutions.
Looking beyond an immediate attack on bucketeers, Congress
should divest the CFTC of its exclusive jurisdiction over off-
exchange transactions. This would return the regulatory scheme to
its state before the enactment of the CFTCA. This was the
direction in which Congress was leaning when it gave the states
jurisdiction to prosecute violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act. Although the grant to the states of jurisdiction over the
bucketeers is a step in the right direction, the Act's delegation of
authority to state officials may be an unconstitiutional delegation of
executive authority. 20
0
Congress should clear up the disorder it has created by
restoring the law to its pre-CFTCA state. It was a mistake to grant
the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over off-exchange transactions,
and the last five years have evidenced the enormity of that mistake.
And, with all that has happened, Harold Goldstein, the man who
started it all, is back at the same old scam.
20 1
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